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LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
States may require the consent of the unwed father, as well as the
unwed mother, for adoption. Apparently, state legislatures may, in
the alternative, dispense with the requirement of parental consent
for adoption and make the "best interests of the child" the control-
ling standard. According to Caban the equal protection clause re-
quires only that the parental rights of unwed fathers be afforded
the same degree of protection maternal rights receive. The decision
thus gives adequate protection to the unwed father who is inter-
ested in his child.
Since the constitutionality of many state adoption statutes is
now at least questionable, legislatures should consider a statutory
scheme that would serve the state interest in maintaining an effi-
cient adoption program, protect the rights of all concerned parents,
and promote the best interests of the child. In Caban the Court
gives little guidance in this area. By sidestepping the due process
issue, the Court avoided deciding whether the child's rights are
paramount to those of the parents. The Court could have provided
greater protection for children by expressly stating that parental
rights may be involuntarily terminated where necessary to allow an
adoption in the child's best interests. 9 If the state requires a finding
of unfitness before termination of parental rights, the parent's
rights, rather than the interests of the child, would be the para-
mount consideration in adoption proceedings. Instead, the welfare of
the child should be paramount, and it seems that parental rights
may fairly be predicated on parental responsibility and concern. The
parental right is sacred, but it is no more so than the welfare of the
child. °
Deborah Davis Alleman
Thrasher v. Leggett: JUDICIAL RESTRAINT IN THE
IMPOSITION OF LIQUOR VENDOR LIABILITY
The defendant served liquor to the plaintiff, a highly intoxicated
patron, in violation of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law.' After
89. Stanley presumably would not allow termination of parental rights without a
finding of unfitness where a stranger sought adoption. See text at notes 24-26, supra,
and accompanying text. But where one having a parent relationship with the child
seeks adoption, the best interests of the child should be the controlling factor in the
adoption determination.
90. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1963-1964 Term-Per-
sons, 25 LA. L. REV. 291, 301 (1965).
1. LA. R.S. 26:88(2) (1950). This statute provides: "No person holding a retail
dealer's permit and no agent, associate, employee, representative, or servant of any
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the plaintiff refused to curtail his unruly behavior, the defendant's
employee escorted the plaintiff from the premises. Once outside the
establishment, the plaintiff, in an attempt to strike the defendant's
employee, fell and injured himself. The trial court, relying on Pence
v. Ketchum,2 rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The Third
Circuit Court of Appeal reversed,3 finding the rule established in
Pence inapplicable to the present case.4 The Louisiana Supreme
Court affirmed the court of appeal; reasoning that the "plaintiff's in-
jury was caused not by a breach of duty by the bar owner or his
bouncer but rather by the plaintiff's own obstreperous behavior,"5
the supreme court held that a bar owner is not liable for the mere
act of furnishing liquor to an intoxicated patron. Thrasher v. Leg-
gett, 373 So. 2d 494 (La. 1979).
Historically, at common law no remedy was available when suit
was brought against a purveyor of liquor for injuries either sus-
tained6 or caused 7 by an intoxicated patron. Common bases for deny-
ing recovery have included the following: the consumption of the li-
quor rather than the sale was the proximate cause of the injury;8 the
patron's consumption to the point of intoxication constituted con-
tributory negligence;9 injury to the patron or to a third party was an
such person shall do or permit any of the following acts to be done on or about the
licensed premises: . . . (2) Sell or serve alcoholic beverages to any intoxicated person."
2. 326 So. 2d 831 (La. 1976). "The trial court ... found that defendant had a duty
not to sell alcohol to plaintiff, that removing plaintiff from the club in his condition was
negligence, and that defendant's employees had the last clear chance to avoid the acci-
dent." Thrasher v. Leggett, 373 So. 2d 494, 496 (La. 1979).
3. 365 So. 2d 1149 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
4. The basis for the, court of appeal's refusal to allow recovery under Pence was
that plaintiff's aggressive behavior not only caused his injury, but also was so sudden
that defendant's employee had no opportunity to prevent plaintiff's injury; thus, the
doctrine of "last clear chance" was not available to circumvent plaintiffs contributory
negligence. Id. at 1152.
5. 373 So. 2d at 497.
6. See, e.g., Hitson v. Dwyer, 61 Cal. App. 2d 803, 143 P.2d 952 (1943); Noonan v.
Galick, 19 Conn. Supp. 308, 112 A.2d 892 (1955); Reed v. Black Caesar's Forge Gourmet
Restaurant, 165 So. 2d 787 (Fla. App. 1964); Cruse v. Aden, 20 N.E. 73 (Ill. 1889); Man-
thei v. Heimerdinger, 332 II. App. 335, 75 N.E.2d 132 (1947); Calvin v. Smith, 37
N.W.2d 368 (Minn. 1949).
7. See, e.g., Cherbonnier v. Rafalovich, 88 F. Supp. 900 (D. Ala. 1950); Carr v.
Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 656 (1965); Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal. App. 2d 246,
210 P.2d 530 (1949); Nolar. v. Morelli, 154 Conn. 432, 226 A.2d 383 (1967); Elder v.
Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966); Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 70 N.W.2d 886
(1955).
8. "[Tihere may be sales without intoxication, but no intoxication without drink-
ing." Collier v. Stamatis, 63 Ariz. 285, 290, 162 P.2d 125, 127 (1945). See, e.g., Cole v.
Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955); Cowman v. Hansen, 250 Iowa 358, 92 N.W.2d
682 (1958); Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 70 N.W.2d 886 (1955); Mason v. Roberts, 33 Ohio
St. 2d 29, 294 N.E.2d 884 (1973); Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis. 66, 288 N.W. 774 (1939).
9. See, e.g., Cookinham v. Sullivan, 23 Conn. Supp. 193, 179 A.2d 840 (1962);
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unforeseeable consequence of the sale;'0 and, the sale of liquor to a
strong and able-bodied person was not tortious conduct."
The apparent harshness of the common law rule has been
legislatively abrogated in many states by the enactment of civil
damage or dram shop statutes. 2 In jurisdictions in which no dram
shop statutes were in effect, many courts have devised theoretical
frameworks whereby the imposition of liability upon tavern keepers
could be effectuated." Adherence to the common law view was over-
come, at earliest instance, when the liquor vendor had knowledge
that the sale was likely to result in serious injury to the patron."
Later, many courts surmounted the common law obstacles to
recovery; and, ultimately, a statutory negligence theory" emerged
James v. Wicker, 309 Ill. App. 397, 33 N.E.2d 169 (1941); Randall v. Village of Ex-
celsior, 103 N.W.2d 131 (Minn. 1960); Ramsey v. Anctil, 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900
(1965); Anslinger v. Martinsville Inn, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 525, 298 A.2d 84 (1972).
10. See, e.g., Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955); Coy v. Cutting, 138
Kan. 109, 23 P.2d 458 (1933); Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis. 66, 288 N.W. 774 (1939).
11. See, e.g., Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955); Cruse v. Aden, 127
Ill. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889); James v. Wicker, 309 Ill. App. 397, 33 N.E.2d 169 (1941);
Farmers Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Gast, 17 Wis. 2d 344, 117 N.W.2d 347 (1962); Seibel v.
Leach, 233 Wis. 66, 288 N.W. 774 (1939).
12. Dram shop or civil damage statutes usually impose strict liability on liquor
vendors when the intoxication of the customer causes injury to third persons and, in
some states, to the patron himself. The Minnesota statute is typical:
Every husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person who is
injured in person or property, or means of support, by any intoxicated person, or
by the intoxication of any person, has a right of action, in his own name, against
any person who, by illegally selling, bartering or giving intoxicating liquors,
caused the intoxication of such person, for all damages, sustained ....
MINN. STAT. § 340.95 (1961).
13. As Dean Prosser has noted, courts may control the imposition of liability
through their ability to delineate the defendant's duty, and this "duty" is merely "an
expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say
that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection." W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS §
53, at 325 (4th ed. 1971). In deciding whether or not to impose liability on liquor ven-
dors in the absence of a dram shop statute, a court might consider factors such as the
bar owner's ability to prevent injury by refusing to sell to an intoxicated patron, the
relative ease with which the bar owner can bear the financial loss by passing it on to
consumers or by obtaining insurance, and the effect imposing liability may have on
deterring negligent sales. See Note, Dram Shop Liability-A Judicial Response, 57
CAL. L. REV. 995, 1015-19 (1969).
14. See McCue v. Klein, 60 Tex. 168 (1883) (habitual drunkard induced to-consume
excessive amount of liquor with knowledge that serious injury or death would follow;
recovery allowed presumably under an intentional tort theory).
15. For example, by imposing upon the liquor vendor a duty which included the
protection of the intoxicated patron, the courts effectively removed contributory
negligence as a defense. This was most often accomplished by deriving the vendor's
duty from a penal statute arguably enacted for the protection of a class of persons of
which the patron was a member. The principle adopted by the courts was set forth in
the Restatement of Torts: "If the defendant's negligence consists of the violation of a
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which culminated in the recognition of a common law cause of action
against tavern keepers who sold liquor in violation of penal
statutes.7
statute enacted to protect a class of persons from their inability to exercise self-
protective care, a member of such class is not barred by his contributory negligence
from recovery for bodily harm caused by the violation of such statute." RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS § 483 (1934). See, e.g., Vance v. United States, 355 F. Supp. 756 (D. Alas.
1973); Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, 84 N.J. Super. 372, 202 A.2d 208, (1964); Majors v.
Brodhead Hotel, 416 Pa. 265, 205 A.2d 873 (1965).
Courts also rejected the notion that the consumption of the alcohol rather than the
sale was the proximate cause of the accident. They found that injury to an intoxicated
patron or to an innocent third party was a foreseeable consequence and thus the prox-
imate result of the negligent sale. See, e.g., Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269
F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959); Vesely v. Sager, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623, 486 P.2d 151 (1971); Rap-
paport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959); McKinney v. Foster, 391 Pa. 221, 137
A.2d 502 (1958).
16: The practice of adopting a standard of care from a criminal statute was
already well-established by the time it was utilized to impose liability on liquor ven-
dors. See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 34 (2d ed. 1955); Morris, The
Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HARV. L. REV. 453 (1932). RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965) provides:
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the re-
quirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose pur-
pose is found to be exclusively or in part
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is
invaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm
results.
Virtually all of the states have statutes which make it unlawful to sell liquor to minors
and to intoxicated persons. By construing these laws so as to satisfy the requirements
outlined in section 286 of the Restatement, the courts easily overcame the theoretical
impasse to the imposition of liquor vendor liability that previously existed at common
law. See note 15, supra. Prosser apparently found this practice remonstrative as he
noted that courts often have "purported to 'find' in the statute a supposed 'implied,'
'constructive,' or 'presumed' intent to provide for tort liability," and that "[i]n the or-
dinary case this is pure fiction." W. PROSSER, supra note 13, at 191. By way of explana-
tion Prosser surmised: "Perhaps . . . the courts are seeking, by something in the
nature of judicial legislation, to further the ultimate policy for the protection of in-
dividuals which they find underlying the statute, and which they believe the
legislature must have had in mind." Id.
17. Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 296 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), and Rap
paport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959), are two signal cases in the movement
toward recognition of a common law cause of action against liquor vendors. See Com-
ment, Negligence Actions Against Liquor Purveyors: Filling the Gap in South Dakota,
23 S.D. L. REV. 227 (1978); Note, supra note 13; Note, Torts-Liability of Tavern
Keepers for Injurious Consequences of Illegal Sales of Intoxicating Liquors, 20 LA. L.
REV. 800 (1960); Note, Liability of Liquor Vendors to Third Party Victims, 56 NEB. L.
REV. 951 (1977). See also Vance v. United States, 355 F. Supp. 756 (D. Alas. 1973);
Vesely v. Sager, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623, 486 P.2d 151 (1971); Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc.,
353 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d 18 (1968); Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, 413 Pa.
626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964).
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Louisiana courts initially followed the traditional common law
rule of nonliability for vendors of intoxicating liquor. For example,
in Robinson v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 8 the plaintiff based his
cause of action on the defendant's illegal sale of liquor to the plain-
tiff's minor son, claiming that the violation of related penal
statutes19 constituted fault under Civil Code article 2315.20 In sus-
taining the exception of no cause of action, the First Circuit Court of
Appeal concluded that the plaintiff's petition contained affirmative
allegations showing contributory negligence sufficient to bar the
plaintiff's recovery." A recognition of negligence on the part of the
liquor vendor was implicit in the court's finding of contributory
negligence on the part of the plaintiff; however, in the absence of a
dram shop statute, the court felt it inappropriate to allow recovery.2
Subsequent to the Robinson decision, the Louisiana Supreme
Court addressed the issue of a liquor vendor's liability in Lee v.
Peerless Insurance Co." In Lee, the defendant bar owner violated a
penal statute" by serving drinks to the plaintiff who was visibly in-
toxicated. The plaintiff relied on this violation as the basis of his
right to recover damages. The supreme court dismissed the
plaintiff's action- expressly following the common law rule25 -by
reasoning that the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury was the
consumption of the alcohol rather than the sale2" and that under the
facts the doctrine of last clear chance was not available to circum-
18. 135 So. 2d 607 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
19. Revised Statutes 14:91 at that time proscribed the sale of spiritous liquors to
any person under twenty-one years of age; Revised Statutes 26:88(1) prohibits a bar
owner from selling or serving alcoholic beverages to any person under eighteen years
of age.
20. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2315 states in pertinent part: "Every act whatever of man
that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it."
21. The court found: "Unquestionably a simple reading of the recitations of plain-
tiffs petition conclusively shows that any injuries suffered by plaintiff . . . resulted
from [plaintiff's] own misconduct which was the proximate cause of the alleged injury."
135 So. 2d at 609.
22. "The Legislature of Louisiana has not seen fit to subject liquor vendors to
civil liability for selling to intoxicated or minor persons alcoholic beverages and deny
to the vendor of the liquor the right to plead the contributory negligence of the vendee
in consuming the liquor." Id.
23. 248 La. 982, 183 So. 2d 328 (1966).
24. LA. R.S. 26:88(2) (1950). See note 1, supra.
25. 248 La. at 987, 183 So. 2d at 330. In discussing the propriety of adopting com-
mon law notions as "controlling under our jurisprudence," the court perfunctorily
disposed of the practice by stating: "In interpreting and carrying out the purposes of
our basic law as set out in Article 2315 of the R.C.C., Louisiana has followed the com-
mon law in tort cases." Id. at 987 n.4, 183 So. 2d at 330 n.4.
26. Id. at 987, 183 So. 2d at 330.
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vent the plaintiff's contributory negligence.27 Moreover, the court
refused to accept the position that Revised Statutes 26:88(2) created
by implication a basis for recovery in tort,28 viewing the absence of a
dram shop statute in Louisiana as an indication that no such remedy
was intended by the legislature.29
With only one member of the court dissenting in Lee,0 the issue
of liquor vendor liability seemed firmly resolved in Louisiana.
However, under an almost identical factual situation, the court later
reversed its position in Pence v. Ketchum." In Pence the court ad-
dressed the narrow question of whether the plaintiff's petition
stated a cause of action. Ruling in the affirmative, the court gave
two grounds for the decision. First, the court stated that Revised
Statutes 26:88(2) imposes a duty on bar owners to refrain from serv-
ing liquor to intoxicated patrons and provides "a standard for deter-
mining negligence, or fault, under Articles 2315 and 2316 of the
Louisiana Civil Code."32 Additionally, the court determined that a
patron's invitee status33 imposed a separate duty, on the bar owner
27. Id. at 993, 183 So. 2d at 332.'
28. Id. at 990, 183 So. 2d at 331. The court was concerned with acting beyond the
limits of its authority: "For us to hold that R.S. 26:88(2), by implication, abrogates the
common law on this subject .. .would require us to exercise legislative prerogatives
which, under our state and national constitutions, the judiciary is prohibited from do-
ing." Id. at 992, 183 So. 2d at 332 (emphasis in original).
29. Id. at 992-93, 183 So. 2d at 332. The court reasoned:
Had the legislature intended this result by the adoption of . . .R.S. 26:88, it
could have said so in a few plain and simple words. Our conclusion that such a
result was not intended is fortified by the fact that although there have been for
a number of years decisions at the appellate court level invoking and following
the common law in this respect . . .the legislature, although meeting with
regularity since these decisions, has taken no steps to adopt clarifying legislation
or require this extraordinary care of intoxicated persons frequenting public places
selling and dispensing alcoholic beverages.
Id.
30. Justice Sanders delivered a vigorous dissent. 248 La. at 994, 183 So. 2d at 33.
31. 326 So. 2d*831 (La. 1976). With the passing of a decade between the two deci-
sions, there was a change in the composition of the court. Justice Sanders (the lone
dissenter in Lee) wrote the majority opinion in Pence which was basically a restate-
ment of his earlier dissent.
32. Id. at 835. The court reached this conclusion by finding that the statute was
intended by the legislature to afford some protection to intoxicated patrons from their
inability to exercise care on their own behalf; and from this determination, the court
concluded: "Under the allegations of the petition, plaintiff falls within the protected
class, and the risk encountered was of the type the duty was designed to prevent." Id.
The court was employing a statutory negligence theory to impose liability. See note
16, supra.
33. In two cases after the Pence decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court aban-
doned the common law trespasser-licensee-invitee classifications and chose instead to
determine negligence on the basis of a reasonable man standard or a duty of ordinary
19801
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
to "refrain from affirmative acts which increase the peril to his in-
toxicated patrons" and that an action in tort will lie against the in-
vitor when a breach of this duty results in foreseeable injury.34 Ad-
dressing the issue of contributory negligence, the court concluded
that under the allegations of the plaintiff's petition, the doctrine of
last clear chance was available to defeat the defense of contributory
negligence by the plaintiff. 5 Thus, the court held that the plaintiff's
petition stated a cause of action under Civil Code articles 2315 and
2316 by alleging fault, causation, and damage.3"
In Thrasher v. Leggett, the court rejected the notion set forth
in Pence that Revised Statutes 26:88(2) provides a basis for a cause
of action in tort against bar owners who sell liquor to intoxicated
persons. Regarding the circumstance in which an inebriated patron
is injured as a result of his intoxicated condition, the Thrasher court
reasoned that the proximate cause of such injury is the consumption
of the alcohol rather than the sale. 7 But while the Thrasher court
limited the rule in Pence regarding liquor vendor liability for serv-
ing intoxicating liquors, it found that the Pence decision was correct
insofar as it determined that Civil Code article 2315 imposed a duty
on bar owners to refrain from ejecting a helplessly intoxicated
patron into a dangerous environment. 8 In determining whether a
bar owner has breached his duty, the court stated that the proper
standard for considering wrongful ejectment is "whether his conduct
was that generally required of a reasonable man under like cir-
cumstances." 9 Applying that standard to the facts of the instant
case, the court concluded that because the defendant was obligated
by law 0 to maintain order in his establishment and to protect other
care under the circumstances. But regarding the factual situation present in the noted
case, the change in analysis has resulted only in a change in terminology. Whereas the
bar owner's duty not to increase his patron's peril was formerly imposed by reason of
the invitor-invitee relationship, it is now imposed as a duty of ordinary care under the
circumstances. See Shelton v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 334 So. 2d 406 (La. 1976); Cates
v. Beauregard Elec. Coop., Inc., 328 So. 2d 367 (La. 1976).
34. 326 So. 2d at 836.
35. Id. at 837. Examining the plaintiff's petition, the court found that plaintiffs
antecedent negligence in consuming the alcohol reduced her to a state of helplessness
which was obvious to the defendant. Thereafter, the defendant had the opportunity, in
the exercise of reasonable care, to prevent the plaintiffs injury but failed to do so.
Thus, all the elements necessary for the application of the doctrine of last clear chance
were present in the situation and could be utilized by the plaintiff on remand. See
generally W. PROSSER, supra note 13, at 427-33.
36. 326 So. 2d at 838.
37. 373 So. 2d at 496.
38. Id. at 497.
39. Id.
40. LA. R.S. 26:88(5) (1950) provides: "No person holding a retail dealer's permit
and no agent, associate, employee, representative, or servant of any such person shall
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patrons from injury, the removal of the plaintiff from the premises
with reasonable force was consonant with that conduct expected of a
reasonable man under like circumstances. Thus, the defendant
breached no duty it owed to the plaintiff, whose injury was regard-
ed by the court as the direct result of his own aggressive acts.4'
By rejecting the statutory negligence theory employed in
Pence4 and reverting to the proximate cause analysis articulated in
Lee, the supreme court has effectively removed what it apparently
considers to be the strict liability effect of the statutory negligence
cause of action recognized in Pence.' This change in legal
philosophy by the court is very significant since now a bar owner's
mere selling of the liquor will not render him liable to the patron.
do or permit any of the following acts to be done on or about the licensed premises: ... (5)
Permit any disturbance of the peace ......
41. 373 So. 2d at 497.
42. See note 32, supra, and accompanying text.
43. The court found that aspect of the Pence decision improper as it recognized a
cause of action which has traditionally been supplied in other states by the legislature
through the enactment of a civil damage or dram shop act. Writing the opinion for the
majority in Thrasher, Justice Calogero remarked that writs were granted primarily to
re-examine the holding in Pence that "an alcoholic beverage retailer's sale of alcoholic
beverages to an intoxicated person in violation of R.S. 26:88(2) gives rise to a cause of
action by such patron who suffers injuries as a result of the intoxication." 373 So. 2d at
495. Notice the similarity between the elements giving rise to a cause of action in
Pence under the statutory negligence theory, and the elements required under a Con-
necticut dram shop statute imposing strict liability on liquor vendors for injuries to
third parties: "(1) a sale of intoxicating liquor (2) to an intoxicated person (3) who, in
consequence of such intoxication, causes injury to the person or property of another."
Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241, 246, 129 A.2d 606, 610 (Conn. 1957), citing CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 4307 (Supp. 1955) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 30-102 (1978)).
Theoretically, of course, the two actions are dissimilar as one is based on fault by
breach of a duty imposed by statute, and the other is, in concept, liability imposed
without fault. However, with regard to the practical consequences, the differences are
more semantic than real. Each action requires a sale of liquor to an intoxicated person
with injuries resulting from the intoxicated condition. The only real dissimilarity be-
tween the two actions is that, presumably, in Pence, it was necessary to invoke the
doctrine of last clear chance in order to circumvent the plaintiff's contributory
negligence in consuming the alcohol; however, this can be seen merely as a technical
requirement as the court in Pence could simply have defined the bar owner's statutory
duty to include the foreseeable consequence of the patron's fault in consuming the
alcohol-a position advocated by Justice Dixon in his concurrence and accepted by
other courts. See, e:g., Vance v. United States, 355 F. Supp. 756, 759-60 (D. Alas. 1973);
Schelin v. Goldberg, 146 A.2d 648, 652-53 (Pa. Super. 1958). Other writers have com-
mented that the court's application of the last clear chance doctrine to the facts of
Pence was not without conceptual difficulty and was utilized more as a means to allow
recovery rather than to perpetuate the proper use of the doctrine. See Note, Bar
Owners, Inebriates, and Last Clear Chance, 37 LA. L. REV. 617, 623 (1977); Note, Intox-
ication: No Longer a Bar to Patron's Action Against Tavern Owner, 22 Loy. L. REV.
867, 874 (1976).
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Under the court's rationale, the plaintiff's voluntary and excessive
consumption of the alcohol becomes the proximate cause of any
resulting injury.
Although the court utilizes the proximate cause analysis which
was employed in Lee, it does not totally preclude a finding of liabili-
ty on the part of the bar owner. For example, a bar owner's act in
ejecting a helplessly intoxicated patron into the dangers of a nearby
highway will render him liable if foreseeable injury results." Under
Thrasher, the proper standard to determine whether a bar owner
has breached his duty to refrain from wrongfully ejecting a helpless
patron is "whether his conduct was that generally required of a
reasonable man under like circumstances."'" To determine the
present scope of the bar owner's liability, it is necessary to view in
conjunction with this statement the rule preserved from the Pence
decision: "Article 2315 imposes upon a bar owner a duty to avoid af-
firmative acts which increase the peril to an intoxicated patron." ' It
is submitted that these statements do not represent two separate
duties owed by bar owners to their patrons, but rather, the Pence
rule is merely an amplified statement of the reasonable man stan-
dard articulated in Thrasher regarding the bar owner's duty to
refrain from wrongful ejectment. The court's method of applying the
reasonable man standard to the facts of the present case lends
credence to this contention.
In applying the Thrasher statement of duty, the court first
determined whether any affirmative act of the defendant caused the
plaintiff's injury. Concluding that the injury was caused "not by any
affirmative act of defendant's, but simply by plaintiff's inebriated
condition,"'7 the court implicitly dismissed the defendant's act of
removing the plaintiff as the proximate cause of the injury. Con-
versely, once the court determined that the defendant did no act
which increased the plaintiff's peril, but that the plaintiff's injury
was a consequence of the intoxicated condition, the proximate cause
of the injury must have necessarily been the plaintiff's voluntary
and excessive consumption of the alcohol. 8 Finally, the court ex-
44. 373 So. 2d at 497. The Thrasher decision specifically preserved Pence as it ap-
plies to its facts, and indeed purports to perpetuate the rule of liability for wrongful
ejectment.
45. Id.
46. Id. Of course, in the literal sense every act is an affirmative act, but the court
is referring to acts other than the selling of liquor, viz., an affirmative act of legal
significance in the court's method of analysis, the most notable example being the act
of ejectment.
47. Id.
.48. This is a corollary of the principle that "the cause more proximate to an injury
to an inebriated patron which results from his intoxication is the consumDtion of the
alcohol and not the sale." Id. at 496.
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amined in detail the acts of the defendant's employee in dealing with
the plaintiff and adjudged them to have been reasonable under the
circumstances. In so doing, the court necessarily implied that
although the defendant's act in removing the plaintiff was an
affirmative act, it did not unreasonably increase the peril to which
the plaintiff was already exposed due to his intoxicated condition.
To have found otherwise could have entailed the imposition of
liability under the Pence rationale.
Functionally, a bar owner's liability under Thrasher pivots on
whether the injury results merely from the intoxicated condition or
whether it results from an affirmative act (e.g., ejectment) by the
owner which increases the peril to the intoxicated patron. If the in-
jury is deemed to result from the intoxicated condition, that is, if
the patron's negligence in consuming the alcohol is operative up un-
til the time the injury is sustained, without any intervening
negligence or outside force, the court should find that the proximate
cause of the injury is the consumption rather than the sale. Regard-
ing these circumstances, Justice Calogero remarked that "[t]here is
a real element of contributory negligence implicit in this situation."'9
But to say that the plaintiff is actually contributorily negligent
presupposes negligence on the part of the bar owner; and the only
act by the bar owner which could be negligent in this situation is
furnishing liquor to an intoxicated patron which is also a violation of
Revised Statutes 26:88(2), but which is not actionable negligence.
However, it is not necessary to base the determination of negligence
on a violation of the statute; a finding that a reasonably prudent bar
owner would not serve additional liquor to a visibly intoxicated
patron would suffice. In any case, the bar owner's mere furnishing
of the liquor to the patron will not render him liable since the plain-
49. Id. at 496-97. There is great significance in regarding the voluntary consump-
tion of the alcohol as contributory negligence on the part of the patron. To do so
presupposes negligence on the part of the liquor vendor which, under certain cir-
cumstances, could be a source of potential liability for his acts in selling the liquor. For
example, this bar to recovery which is personal to the patron and prevents him from
recovering would not extend to an innocent third party who is injured through the
negligence of the intoxicated patron. Conceding that the bar owner is also at fault by
reason of the illegal sale, it is conceivable that the courts could find that fault to be a
substantial factor in causing the third party's injury. However, there are no reported
cases dealing with this situation in Louisiana. Also, under Louisiana's new comparative
negligence scheme, the relative culpability of each party's fault would determine
whether the intoxicated patron could maintain a cause of action against the liquor ven-
dor for his negligence in selling the liquor. See 1979 La. Acts, No. 431. Factors such as
whether the vendor had actual knowledge of the patron's intoxication or whether
there was a concerted effort on the part of the bar owner and his employees to induce
the patron to consume excessive amount of alcohol could be important in assessing the
fault of the vendor for the purpose of imposing liability.
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tiff's voluntary consumption of the liquor would always bar his
recovery.
If the injury is a foreseeable consequence of a bar owner's
affirmative acts increasing the patron's peril, then the bar owner
has breached the duty imposed by Civil Code article 2315 to act as a
reasonable man under the circumstances. And although a person's
voluntary intoxication does not relieve him of responsibility for his
own negligence," a bar owner's act in ejecting an intoxicated person
who is incapable of self-protection into a dangerous environment is
an act of negligence subsequent to that person's fault in becoming
intoxicated which, under the court's rationale, becomes the prox-
imate cause of that person's injury.'
The affirmative acts inquiry is merely a concomitant of the
broader Thrasher statement. It can properly be regarded as an
analytical device utilized by the court to discern whether there has
in fact been a breach of the duty imposed by Civil Code article 2315
to act as a reasonable man under similar circumstances. Identifying
the interrelationship between the Thrasher and the Pence
statements can be best accomplished by expressing them thusly: A
reasonably prudent bar owner would not act affirmatively to in-
crease the peril of a person rendered helpless from his intoxicated
condition. If this duty is breached and foreseeable injury results
therefrom, liability will follow.
52
50. See Manuel v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 140 So. 2d 702 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1962).
51. The Thrasher court quoted the following language from Prosser: "There may
be no duty to take care of a man who is ill or intoxicated, and unable to look out for
himself; but it is another thing to eject him into the danger of a railroad yard; and if
he is injured there will be liability." 373 So. 2d at 497, quoting W. PROSSER, supra note
13, at 343. Prosser cites Weymire v. Wolfe, 52 Iowa 533, 3 N.W. 541 (1879), as authori-
ty for this statement.
In Weymire, a tavern keeper ejected a helpless, intoxicated patron into the extreme
cold of late evening. The patron died from the exposure, and the Iowa court reversed a
verdict for the tavern keeper on the basis of an incorrect jury charge. The court found
that "if the defendant negligently subjected Dunn to exposure to his injury, knowing
that he was unconscious, or even helpless, the defendant cannot escape liability on ac-
count of Dunn's negligence prior to the wrongful acts . . . however great Dunn's
negligence may have been in allowing himself to become intoxicated." Id. at 535, 3
N.W. at 543.
52. Since liability depends only on the bar owner's negligence in affirmatively act-
ing to increase his patron's peril after that patron has reached an intoxicated state, the
bar owner's antecedent conduct in selling the liquor should not enter into the court's
consideration. The analysis seems to be complete at this point. Thus, if a person
already intoxicated enters a bar owner's establishment but buys no drinks (no Revised
Statutes 26:88(2) violation occurs) and later, the bar owner ejects that person into an
area adjacent to a dangerous highway or a railroad yard, liability should be imposed if
foreseeable injury results. The act of negligence in ejecting the person remains un-
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While the court found that the Pence decision may have been
correct in applying the doctrine of last clear chance to allow
recovery, that doctrine was not available to the plaintiff in
Thrasher. The court concluded that "[pilaintiff's injury did not result
from defendant's failure to prevent plaintiff's injury, but rather
from plaintiff's own aggressive, violent behavior."53 Whether the
court's unwillingness to apply the doctrine in this situation stems
from a determination that the defendant had no opportunity5' to
prevent the injury, or simply that the defendant had no duty5 to
prevent that particular injury, is unclear. What does seem clear is
that the court is emphasizing the contributory negligence that it
considers to be implicit in the situation in which a person
voluntarily becomes intoxicated. However, it is submitted that the
application of the doctrine of last clear chance under the Thrasher
rationale is unnecessary. In Pence the court found the doctrine
applicable by finding first, that the defendant was aware of the in-
toxicated patron's helplessness; second, that the defendant had the
changed regardless of the bar owner's antecedent conduct.
But while the test seems complete in restricting the analysis to the bar owner's af-
firmative acts, the rule should not be viewed as an inflexible one. For example, if the
plaintiff in the instant case had not injured himself as a result of the violent encounter,
but instead, after the encounter had wandered onto a nearby highway and been in-
jured, a strict application of the test would result in liability being imposed on the bar
owner. The defendant would have ejected an intoxicated patron into a hazardous en-
vironment with foreseeable injury resulting. However, while the bar owner would
have been guilty of culpable conduct in having served drinks to an intoxicated patron
and in removing him from the establishment, thereby increasing his peril, the
reasonableness of plaintiff's removal under the circumstances would have militated
against a finding of liability. Although the affirmative acts test would have been
satisfied, it could also be argued that a reasonable man under like circumstances would
have so acted, especially since the removal may be viewed as necessary to keep order
which is required by law. The outcome in this situation would depend upon the impor-
tance placed by the court on Revised Statutes 26:88(5) and whether the policy favoring
protection of the intoxicated patron outweighs the bar owner's interest in removing
persons engaged in disruptive conduct without any further obligation to care for them.
53. 373 So. 2d at 497 (emphasis added).
54. This was the conclusion reached by the court of appeal in the instant case.
That court found:
The trial judge invoked the doctrine of "last clear chance" on the ground that
"Defendant had the last clear chance to see that Plaintiff would not injure
himself." The attempted attack on the employee by plaintiff was sudden. The
bouncer had no opportunity to reflect and avoid the plaintiff's fall as a result of
such attack. The doctrine is not applicable.
365 So. 2d 1149, 1151-52 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978) (emphasis added).
55. If it were determined that at the time the plaintiff's injury occurred, the
defendant had not removed the plaintiff into a hazardous area, then there would be no
breach of the defendant's duty for failing to prevent an injury caused solely by reason
of the plaintiff's intoxicated condition.
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opportunity to prevent the increase in the plaintiff's peril;" and
third, that the defendant failed to take that opportunity by ejecting
the plaintiff into a hazardous environment. 7 Thus, the plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence in consuming the alcohol was defeated by
invoking the doctrine of last clear chance. But it is obvious that the
ejectment in this situation is simultaneously the breach of a duty
under article 2315 to refrain from acting affirmatively to increase
the danger to an intoxicated person, and what the court has implied-
ly deemed to be a negligent failure to take the last clear chance to
prevent the plaintiff's increased peril. Since the defendant's act in
ejecting the intoxicated patron into a hazardous environment and
his failure to refrain from ejecting the intoxicated patron into a
hazardous environment are one and the same, it would facilitate a
clearer and more logical analysis to view the act as the breach of
the article 2315 duty to act as a reasonable man under the cir-
cumstances. The negligent act of the bar owner in ejecting a
helpless person into a perilous environment then becomes the prox-
imate cause of any resulting foreseeable injury.
The Thrasher decision represents a retreat by the Louisiana
Supreme Court to a more conservative standpoint regarding liquor
vendor liability. However, by reverting to the proximate cause
analysis articulated in Lee, the court has not regressed to the point
of reinstating the traditional common law view of nonliability for li-
quor vendors. By restrictively redefining the scope of the bar
owner's duty and by overruling the statutory negligence theory of
recovery recognized in Pence, the court has undercut the notion
that the jurisprudential equivalent of a dram shop statute exists in
Louisiana. The decision represents at least a tentative constriction
in an otherwise expanding area of liability; the court is apparently
unwilling to perpetuate the bold position taken in Pence in the
absence of legislative approval.
Clay Morgan Allen
56. It can only be a failure to prevent the plaintiffs increased peril rather than
the plaintiffs injury, because at this point there is no certainty that foreseeable injury
will result.
57. Specifically, the Pence court found: "Plaintiffs negligence in becoming intox-
icated had allegedly placed her in a condition of obvious helplessness. Defendants were
aware of her peril. Nonetheless, the defendants failed to use an opportunity to avoid
harm to the plaintiff. Hence, the petition leaves adequate room for the application of
Last Clear Chance." 326 So. 2d at 837. The cases cited by the court concerning last
clear chance all involve a situation in which the person failing to take the opportunity
to avoid the accident was in control of the instrumentality which caused the plaintiffs
injury. This is not the case when a bar owner ejects a helpless patron into a dangerous
area. However, the Pence court found the incapacity of the plaintiff to be the relevant
factor that gives rise to the duty to save, and, thus, the plaintiffs subsequent
movements onto the highway did not render the doctrine inapplicable. Id. at 838.
[Vol. 40
